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INTRODUCTION 
Diversity-consciousness in a post-Grutter era has taken 
on new meaning than previously conceived in constitutional 
jurisprudence. Yet despite the victory of colleges and universities 
to use race in student admissions, the full reality of diversity 
recruitment is not found in the Grutter1 and Gratz2 decisions 
themselves but rather in the implications of the decisions for 
another prominent battle that lurks on the horizon: the battles for 
race-based financial aid.   
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1 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003). 
2 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003). 
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These battles which are sure to ensue with greater 
frequency in the coming years appear to be even more of a 
critical high stakes struggle that directly implicates the promise of 
the expanded diversity interest recognized in Grutter and Gratz.
Indeed, race conscious grants and scholarships are so paramount 
to achieving racial diversity that it is likely that many admissions 
officials would view the award of race-based grants even more 
vital to the effective recruitment, matriculation and retention of 
minority students than the mere plus factor use of race in an 
individualized admissions process.3
Considering further that many minority applicants are 
likely to hail from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, the 
considerations of cost are likely to weigh heavier than nearly any 
other factor in a student’s decision where to attend college.4 As 
a member of the admissions committee intimately involved in 
minority student recruitment, it is a fact of nature in each 
recruitment cycle that many minority students are compelled to 
reject prestigious admissions offers faced with the inability to 
afford tuition that race-based financial grants might otherwise 
make it possible to attend.5
Consequently, college and university admissions offices 
are now confronted with a uniquely important challenge.  No 
longer are we satisfied with a nebulous notion of diversity.  As 
O’Connor detailed, meaningful racial diversity in the classroom 
should translate into a racially diverse set of national leaders. She 
writes that if we are to "cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy 
in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to 
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of 
every race."   
Accordingly, we know that racial diversity in the 
classroom is a compelling state interest by way of looking to the 
outcome of such classroom diversity. Maintaining a selective 
military officer core from the ROTC ranks consisting of racial 
minorities and fostering civic leaders is viewed as a critical benefit 
of classroom diversity on college and university campuses.  
Another purported benefit is the multicultural competence the 
global marketplace demands of employees of prestigious fortune 
500 companies who filed the “3-M brief” in the Michigan case.    
But herein lies a critical question.  Does either the need 
for legitimacy by fostering civic leadership from every racial 
3 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994). 
4 Approximately one in six students deemed as qualified low-income 
applicants are African American.  See Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences, supra 
note 11, at 450; WILLIAM G. BOWEN, SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM 
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 
ADMISSIONS 46 - 50 (1998). 
5 Maurice R. Dyson, In Search of The Talented Tenth: Diversity, Affirmative 
Access and University-Driven Reform, 6 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 41, (2003). 
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group, the need for diverse military officers or the need for 
multicultural competence in the global marketplace amount to 
the same compelling interests upheld in Bakke? Because the 
classroom benefits generally claimed for diversity of perspective 
was the only compelling interest that Justice Powell upheld, at 
least one commentator has suggested the Court misapplied 
Bakke.6
By adding additional interest as national legitimacy of 
leaders and equal access to leadership paths, it is argued that the 
Supreme Court misapprehend the precise compelling state 
interest at stake in Grutter and Gratz.7 If so, then are we correct 
to conclude that the interest alleged to be compelling was not "a 
diverse student body" but rather the "educational benefits" that 
presumably flow from such a diverse student body?  The 
distinction is critical not only for a constitutionally permissible 
admission policy, but it is also of critical importance in a financial 
aid policy that arguably is designed to further the admissions 
office’s use of race to achieve diversity.  In the former, the 
appropriate remedy is to use race as means in and of itself 
whereas in the latter, racial diversity through a critical mass is a 
principle means to achieve the educational benefits that flow 
from a critical mass.   
So what do the Grutter and Gratz decisions tell us about 
the legality of race based financial aid or how its legal status 
should be construed to support the twin aims of diversity and 
legitimacy?  Further, to what extent does the Court’s purported 
deference to the university’s use of race vis-à-vis a First 
Amendment-based academic freedom shield university officials 
from concerns regarding race-based scholarships as a means to 
achieve campus diversity.  How do these decisions fit into the 
constellation of past Supreme Court precedent that has attacked 
race-based scholarships on grounds that would now seem to 
crumble under O’Connor’s ruling in Grutter. How does a 
university structure and administer race-conscious financial aid or 
can it?  
This article will attempt to address these doctrinal 
ambiguities and in so doing, suggest some modest claims in 
support of the diversity principle as furthered through 
constitutionally permissible race-conscious financial aid schemes. 
For instance, I would like to begin by attempting to unpack some 
the doctrinal complexities that illustrate the yet unanswered 
difficulties with race-based financial aid.  My principle endeavor 
here is to show that although there are means to construct a 
6 Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. Grutter and Gratz: A Critical Analysis, 41 Hous. 
L. Rev. 459 (2004).  
7 Id. These include the international competence of future fortune 500 
companies and the racial diversity of the military officer core.  
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narrowly tailored financial aid program in compliance with Grutter 
and Gratz, deference to the goals of legitimacy and diversity 
raised by these important cases require us to carefully ponder 
whether to import race conscious admissions principles into the 
financial aid context. Indeed, it is questionable whether the 
guidelines espoused in Grutter and Gratz, even if faithfully 
adhered to, would ever feasibly achieve the needed diversity of 
underrepresented minorities as a pure admissions question.  
The picture, however, appears evens more bleak when 
one takes into account the lack of true diversity that will be 
reinforced by a race-neutral financial aid scheme that afford little 
racial diversity in actuality.  Because the Supreme Court indicated 
that the University of Michigan’s role was to educate, not merely 
admit, future leaders of all races, then it follows that in order to 
do so, students must be able to afford to sit in the classroom in 
order for the robust exchange of ideas to take place.    While I 
shall suggest some modest racially neutral means universities may 
pursue in devising scholarship programs and the means to 
narrowly tailor race-plus factor approaches, it remains painfully 
obvious that there is only one clear alternative. Private, race-
based, donor restricted financial aid schemes, administered by 
universities, promises to be the most effective in terms of 
achieving actual diversity of underrepresented minorities.  
Unfortunately, it also appears that this option is the least feasible 
under Grutter and Gratz and prior precedent.  To be sure, beyond 
narrow tailoring analysis, state action remains the most 
formidable obstacle to such a suggestion.  This need not mean, 
however, that universities remain constrained.  As I shall 
elaborate further below, courts and universities would do well to 
examine the question of state action in the same conceptual lens 
as religious vouchers under Establishment Clause analysis.  The 
theoretical centerpiece of this article, therefore, is to define the 
constitutional contours of this novel proposal and its implications 
for overcoming the difficulties of state action.   
 
Overview 
 
Part I begins by briefly reviewing the question of race 
based financial aid generally and the concerns of narrow tailoring 
as raised by the Podberesky, Grutter and Gratz cases.  It also 
discussed the problem of state action and the contradictory 
treatment of race-restricted grants at various institutions and the 
contradictory interpretation of Title VI in these contexts against 
the backdrop of Gratz. Part II devotes some attention to the 
central question of institutional deference. For instance, to what 
extent should deference be accorded in the post-admissions stage 
of financial aid determinations.  Is there any sound basis to 
distinguish how courts should look at race differently in the 
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financial aid context than from admissions?  Part III explores 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in connection with the question 
of disproportionality or disparate impact of funding approaches 
that target aid indirectly on the basis of race-related factors. Some 
attention is dedicated to the constitutionality of such approaches 
that appear designed to circumvent the plus factor approach of 
Grutter, yet endeavors to avoid the constitutional pitfalls of race-
based aid implicated by Gratz. Part IV discusses the contradictory 
interpretations of Title VI with regard to disparate impact 
regulations under the DOE and the manner in which this 
approach has been abandoned in the Department of Education 
(DOE) unrevised policy guidance on race-based scholarships. 
Part V provides a nuanced analysis on the factors of narrow 
tailoring analysis and the related difficulties of, among other 
things, alleviating undue burden resulting from race-based 
scholarships. Part VII elaborates on a numerical methodology for 
establishing a benchmark by which to measure minority under- 
representation and what qualifies as a critical mass.   Part VIII 
attempts to show three principle ways in which financial aid may 
be allocated to achieve this critical mass of underrepresented 
racial minorities. These three approaches include: (1) employing 
race-plus considerations in holistic race-conscious allocation 
determinations of financial aid; (2) allocating race-based financial 
aid directly from university funding while maintaining race-
conscious admissions process under Grutter and Gratz and; (3) 
administering race-based financial aid selecting recipients for 
private donor, race-restricted, grants while maintaining race-
conscious admissions process under Grutter. Part IX concludes 
with a discussion on the theoretical centerpiece of this article. I 
attempt to extrapolate a novel application of the Establishment 
Clause analogy to the question of race-based scholarships.  While 
not identical, the analogy speaks to the real issues of neutrality 
and endorsement that remain implicit in the debate of 
administering race-base scholarships by universities.  I attempt to 
show by extrapolating from establishment clause cases an 
analytical framework to understand and apply a doctrinal test may 
provide a theoretical basis to “immunize” universities from 
liability from administering race-based scholarships. 
 
PART I 
 
The Constitutionality of Race-Based  
Financial Aid After Podberesky 
 
Neither of the Bollinger cases addresses the constitutional 
question of race-based scholarships at colleges and universities. 
Further, it is clear that past precedent is of little help in clarifying 
2004]  Towards An Establishment Clause Theory  
 
6
this important question, leading to further doctrinal ambiguity on 
the question of race based scholarships.  This is particularly so 
when one considers that, to date, courts that have had occasion 
to consider the question of race-based financial aid have never 
considered whether such aid awards are permissible to achieve 
the diversity interest recently upheld in Grutter. For instance, in  
Podberesky v. Kirwan, the plaintiff Daniel Podberesky was ineligible 
to compete for the merit- based Banneker scholarship at the 
University of Maryland because he is not African-American 
although he met all of the other requirements.8 The court in 
applying the standard articulated in J.A. Croson Co.9 to racial 
minority scholarships at public universities, required that a party 
must, "at a minimum, prove that the [present] effect . . . is caused 
by the past discrimination and that the effect is of sufficient 
magnitude to justify the program."10 The University cited four 
present effects of the past discrimination, the first of which was 
its poor reputation in the African- American community.11 The 
court concluded that "mere knowledge of historical fact [of past 
discrimination] is not the kind of present effect that can justify a 
race-exclusive remedy."12 The University also claimed that the 
hostile racial climate on campus justified its program.13 The court 
was once again not persuaded, claiming that present incidents of 
hostility "do not necessarily implicate past discrimination on the 
part of the University, as opposed to present societal 
discrimination."14 The University's last two claimed present 
effects were based on statistical evidence showing minority 
under-representation and rates of attrition.15 In response, the 
Fourth Circuit dismissed these on procedural grounds given 
conflicting evidence presented by Podberesky.16 The Podberesky 
court highlighted the fact that the University had not 
demonstrated any attempt at a race-neutral solution.17 
Any scholarship distributed along racial lines must also be 
narrowly tailored. Prior to the nuanced analysis of the Grutter and 
Gratz cases, commentators have reduced this requirement to four 
factors: (1) The state must explore possible race-neutral remedies 
and approve race-based remedies only when necessary; (2) any 
8 Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 161. 
9 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
10 Podberesky, at 153. 
11 Id. at 152. 
12 Id. at 154.
13 Id. at 152.
14 Id. at 154. 
15 Id. at 152. 
16 Id. at 155-56. 
17 The court also faulted the University and the lower court for using an 
inappropriate population that considered all qualified African-American 
students as the disadvantaged class, rather than the subclass of Maryland 
residents for whom the university intended the scholarship. 
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race-based remedy must be flexible and temporary; (3) there must 
be a statistical correlation between the race-based remedy and the 
appropriate population; and (4) the race-based remedy must not 
prefer one minority to the exclusion of others.18 Of course, 
because Podberesky involved race-based scholarships as a means to 
address past discrimination as a near insurmountable burden to 
meet, many opponents attacked race-based funding leading up to 
and in the aftermath of the Grutter and Gratz decisions.  In fact, 
recently Princeton and MIT, under complaints from anti-
affirmative action activists, were forced to dissolve their 
programs for minorities and educationally disadvantaged 
students.19 Indeed, it has already been reported that the Center 
for Individual Rights is determining which scholarship program 
based on high school enrollment to sue.20 Other targets include 
minority outreach to high schools and colleges, scholarships, 
fellowships in addition admissions schemes.21 Given the 
forthcoming onslaught of legal challenges, the contour and limits 
of judicial deference to any race-conscious or race-based financial 
aid schemes takes on new significance. 
 
PART II 
 
The Powell Deference 
 
Grutter recognized that the use of race to achieve diversity 
survives strict scrutiny much easier under a First Amendment 
right of a university to constitute its student body as it sees 
proper in order to achieve a critical mass of minorities that will 
lead to certain educational benefits. The Powell deference to a 
university’s academic freedom in Bakke is most apparent in 
Grutter to the neutral observer when one reads O’Connor’s 
opinion. In it, we are told time and time again by O’Connor that 
deference means that racial diversity leads to beneficial 
18 William E. Thro, The Constitutional Problem of Race-Based Scholarships and 
a Practical Solution, 111 Educ. L. Rep. 625, 633-34 (1996).
19 See, e.g., Austin American-Statesman, available at 
http://www.austin360.com/aas/news/ap/ap_story.html/National/AP.V6456
.AP-Princeton-Minor.html (Feb. 7, 2003). 
20 See Ron Nissimov, UT Tailors Scholarship to Minority High Schools,
HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 12, 2002, at A21; Pearce Adams, Reverse Discrimination 
Suits Shelve Black Scholarship Aid at UGA, Atlanta J.-Const., July 3, 2000, at B6; 
Alexis Orenstein, Minority Scholarships Challenged, Daily Pennsylvanian, Feb. 
2, 2004, available at http://www.dailypennsylvanian.com/vnews/ 
display.v/ART/401dfe740db03.  
21 Arthur L. Coleman et al, Diversity In Higher Education: A Strategic 
Planning and Policy Manual Regarding Federal Law in Admissions, Financial Aid, and 
Outreach, 32, at www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/highered/ad/ 
014624WODiversutyHighrEdT.pdf 
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educational benefits and that a critical mass is the best means to 
achieve this pedagogical objective.22 
Although this is consistent with Bakke, Justice Thomas 
did correctly point out that such deference to educational 
expertise involved in constituting a student body did not extend 
to the Virginia Military Institute’s  (VMI) assertion that the 
admission of woman would compromise the quality and nature 
of it educational program. For that matter, Thomas’ argument 
would apply similarly in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 23 
where the Court extended no deference to a nursing school that 
sought to deny admission to males because of implicit gender 
stereotyping of the nursing profession as most appropriate for 
females.  
However, what Justice Thomas neglects to understand is 
that in VMI and Hogan, the issue presented was whether the 
exclusion of a certain class of persons from being admitted to a 
state educational institution solely on the basis of their sex 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. In Grutter and Gratz, the 
issue was not whether a certain class of persons should be 
excluded, and certainly not on the basis of sex, but rather to what 
extent may a certain class of persons be admitted by special 
consideration of their race without running afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Accordingly, Justice Thomas misapprehends 
the nature of the question presented.  The result is an incorrect 
understanding of the deference at issue in the Bollinger cases. If 
the University of Michigan were seeking to deny an entire class of 
persons as in Hogan and VMI, whether it be here all Blacks or all 
whites from admission to the University of Michigan, and 
assuming further their denial was predicated on some racial 
stereotypical perceptions applicable to that entire class, then 
Justice Thomas would be more on the correct track.   To be sure, 
there are racial minorities that would be eligible for admission to 
Michigan without the benefit of any race-conscious 
considerations.  Indeed, there would also presumably be some 
underrepresented racial minorities that would also be eligible for 
admission without such special consideration.  The question, or 
questions then become, is whether race-based diversity as an 
admissions concept satisfy a compelling state interest; how may 
the use of race as a special consideration be narrowly tailored to 
minimize any undue burden on non-recipients; whether achieving 
a critical mass is the best way of satisfying the narrow tailoring 
requirement.   
22 Law School defined critical mass as "numbers such that 
underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons 
for their race." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. 
23 458 U.S. 718, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982).  
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However, it is also clear from Thomas’ remarks that at 
the very least, such deference must never run afoul of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Guarantee in the 
form of a disguised racial quota.    Therefore, universities do not 
have a free hand or absolute discretion to constitute it student 
body entirely as it would see fit. Notwithstanding this, however, it 
is not inconceivable that race-based scholarships may have a 
second bite at the jurisprudential apple after Podberesky.24 Of 
course, the very possibility that race-based financial might be 
permissible under the U.S. Department of Education’s still 
unrevised 1994 policy interpretation if no other viable alternative 
exist, may only further spurn debate about such race-sensitive 
financial grants.25 Before Grutter, most race based scholarships in 
select circuits could not, practically speaking, survive the “fatal in 
fact” standard of strict scrutiny.26 So was it the case with Flanagan 
v. Georgetown Coll.,27 where the court held that a set aside of 
scholarship funds for minority students violates Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 but in Wash. Legal Found. v. Alexander,28 a
court dismissed a challenge which alleged the United States 
Department of Education's change from prohibiting minority 
scholarships to allowing such scholarships violated Title VI. But 
under Title VI regulations, the question remains murky because 
less intrusive, viable means may be available and there may be an 
undue burden on those who are ineligible for the funds as a result 
of the racial restriction.29 Indeed, some will claim that financial 
aid grants based upon economic need rather than race are more 
suitable race-neutral alternatives.30 However, this stance fails to 
recognize that most studies relying on socioeconomic indicators 
alone have proved ineffectual in maintaining previous levels of 
racial diversity and largely tend to benefit low socioeconomic 
whites instead of racial minorities.  However, this point is not 
24 Sara Hebel, The Michigan Rulings: Court Rulings May Open the Door for 
More Use of Race in Student Aid, Chron. Of Higher Educ., Jul. 4, 2003, at S6, 
available at http://chronicle.com/prm/weekly/v49/ i43/43s00601.htm  (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2004).  
25 Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964; Notice of Final Policy Guidance; 59 Fed. Reg. 8756-
01 (Feb. 23, 1994). Under Title VI, private universities operate under the same 
constitutional rules of racial preferences as the Michigan Law School in Grutter 
but confront the same constraints as the Michigan undergraduate LSA college 
in Gratz. 
26 Justice Brennan argued that the Court's review under the Fourteenth 
Amendment should be strict, but not ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.". See 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361-62. 
27 417 F. Supp. 377, 385 (D.D.C. 1976).   
28 778 F. Supp. 67 (D.D.C. 1991). 
29 Notice of Final Policy Guidance; 59 Fed. Reg. 8756-01 (Feb. 23, 
1994).  
30 See e.g., Thro, supra note 9, at 634. 
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without controversy.  Earlier this year, the Century Foundation 
released its own study espousing the effectiveness of such 
schemes.  This report, which is somewhat at odds with the 
current position of the federal government, in that it does 
acknowledge that there is no adequate substitute for race-based 
affirmative action and therefore recommends it be preserved and 
considered in conjunction with socioeconomic factors.31
PART III 
 
What Happened To Disproportionality? 
Title VI and Its Contradictory Interpretation 
In Race-Based Financial Aid 
 
Race consciousness denotes a cognizance of race as being 
a relevant factor among many, race-based denotes an assessment 
which solely relies upon race in a way sure to lead to a 
determinative result.32 Under the Department of Education’s 
1994 Policy Guidance, a “college may make awards of financial 
aid to disadvantaged students, without regard to race or national 
origin, even if that means that these awards go disproportionately 
to minority students.”33 This interpretation could potentially 
mean that colleges and graduate universities can target urban 
feeder high schools or colleges respectively, in ways that are race-
based. Many such scholarships that are race-based may 
specifically target minority students without specifically 
enumerating race as a prerequisite for eligible scholarship 
applicants.   
In fact, there appears to be some support for this 
approach. For instance, under Texas law34, colleges may consider 
a number of factors including family income, whether a student is 
from an urban or rural school, and how that school fared in the 
state accountability ratings in making their admission decisions.35 
Additionally, a university could decide, without exposing itself to 
liability, to target persons who are first generation college bound 
students in their family or who are the first graduate from an 
institution of higher education,36 whether the applicant has 
31 See  Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, 
Race/Ethnicity & Selective College Admissions, http://www.tcf.org/ 
Publications/White_Papers/carnevale_rose.pdf  
32 See Mark Spencer Williams, Skin Formulas Belong In A Bottle: North 
Carolina’s Diversity Scholarships Are Unconstitutional Under Grutter, 26 Campbell L. 
Rev. 135, 144 (2004). 
33 59 Fed. Reg. 8756-01 (Feb. 23, 1994).  
34 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.804 (Vernon 2001). 
35 Id. at (b)(2), (6), (9). 
36 Id. at (b)(3). 
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bilingual proficiency,37 the financial status of the applicant’s 
school district,38 the applicant’s performance on standardized 
tests in comparison with those of other students from similar 
socioeconomic backgrounds,39 whether the applicant attended 
any school which was under a court-ordered desegregation plan,40 
and any other considerations the institution deems necessary to 
accomplish its stated mission.41 
Some other possible race-targeted, race-based 
approaches may even prove more novel in application. For 
instance, it is conceivable to structure scholarship criteria around 
more targeted race related indicia.  These include race-based 
scholarships that target the victims of sickle cell anemia which are 
more likely than not to target African-Americans.42 Likewise, 
scholarships based upon students with a Black Studies major, or 
membership in the Native American Students Association, Alpha 
Phi Alpha or other nonprofit institutions are likely to target 
race.43 The same effect may also apply to scholarships targeting 
those of the Baptist faith or scholarships targeting those who 
simultaneously fall into multiple categories noted above.44 
Notwithstanding minorities that would primarily benefit 
under these approaches, it is hard to see how the DOE’s 
interpretation permitting them could ever comport with the 
strongly worded mandate in the Bollinger cases that racial 
considerations in financial aid must not be outcome 
determinative.45 Further, it is even harder to see how the DOE’s 
policy guidance allowing race-conscious financial is able to 
circumvent its own implementing regulations regarding 
disproportionality.  If the DOE states “college may make awards 
of financial aid to disadvantaged students, without regard to race 
or national origin, even if that means that these awards go 
disproportionately to minority students,”46 how is this policy 
stance reconciled with a disproportionate adverse impact 
analysis?   
37 Id. at (b)(4). 
38 Id. at (b)(5). 
39 Id. at (b)(11). 
40 Id. at (b)(12). 
41 Id. at (b)(18). 
42 Mark Kantrowitz, Affirmative Action and Financial Aid, THE SMART 
STUDENT GUIDE TO FINANCIAL AID, available at http://www.finaid.org/ 
educators/affirmativeaction.phtml 
43 Id. 
44 Id. In accordance with these approaches, this does not mean, 
however, scholarships can be based upon a membership in organizations 
where race or ethnicity is an explicit prerequisite for membership affiliation.  
45 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 321; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 284.
46 59 Fed. Reg. 8756-01 (Feb. 23, 1994). 
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Presumably, if scholarship awards “go disproportion- 
ately to minority students”, non-minority students theoretically 
would have viable complaint that the scholarship leads to a 
disproportionate or disparate adverse impact. The regulations 
implementing Title VI, at 34 C.F.R. Part 100, prohibit 
discrimination that is the result of different treatment,47 as well as 
that resulting from facially neutral policies and practices that have 
an impermissible disparate adverse impact.48 The Education 
Department=s regulations follow caselaw under Title VI, and as 
appropriate, under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, in 
applying these regulations. To that end, we learn from Bakke that 
Title VI is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause and that 
from the infamous Alexander v. Sandoval decision there does not 
exist a private right to enforce disparate regulations, except 
perhaps under Section 198349 and under a formal complaint 
lodged with the DOE and pleaded with particularity.50 
47 Differential treatment analysis essentially has three parts: (1) Are 
there differences in the treatment of minority and non-minority students who 
are similarly situated?; (2) Can the recipient justify these differences?; and (3) 
Are the recipient=s reasons legitimate or a pretext for unlawful discrimination?   
Different treatment cases involve proof of intentional discrimination such that 
acts or omissions are on the basis of race, color, or national origin.  In 
assessing whether actions are race based, intent may be inferred through 
consideration of a variety of factors, such as whether the burdens of the 
decision are greater for students of particular races or national origins, a 
history of discriminatory official actions, departure from the recipient=s norms 
in procedural and substantive matters, and evidence of discrimination in 
statements made during the history of the action, see Village of Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).  A different 
treatment violation does not require proof of bad faith or racial motive by 
school officials.  In these cases, evidence of foreseeable consequences is 
relevant, but not necessarily conclusive, in assessing intent.  
48 The ability of courts to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations 
is demonstrated by the existence of a well-established three-part burden 
shifting framework in which a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of 
disparate impact discrimination, a defendant may offer a substantial and 
legitimate justification in rebuttal, and, finally, if a defendant has offered a 
proper rebuttal, a plaintiff may establish that the defendant ignored an equally 
effective alternative with less discriminatory impact. See generally New York 
Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036; Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. 
Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985); SCCIA II, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 
540-41, 31 ELR at 20688; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 32, at 799-
801; See generally, Mank, South Camden Citizens In Action v. New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection: Will Section 1983 Save Title VI Disparate Impact Suits? 32 
ELR 10454 (2002); Mank, South Camden Citizens In Action v. New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection: Will Section 1983 Save Title VI Disparate 
Impact Suits? 32 ELR 10454 (2002). 
49 See generally Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997); Bradford 
Mank, Using Section 1983 to Enforce Title VI's '602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 321, 332 (2001) (arguing Title VI disparate impact regulations may be 
enforced through '1983).Under Title VI, private universities given the same 
legal protection from so called reverse discrimination suits if they abide by the 
requirements of individualized consideration and narrow tailoring in Bakke and 
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It is unlikely that pure race-based financial aid and 
scholarships can be narrowly tailored under Gratz.  Accordingly, 
some commentators have suggested that if it is constitutionally 
impermissible to employ a two track system or a set-aside in 
student admissions, there is little reason to believe it should be 
permissible to employ similar set asides in the award of financial 
assistance.51 It is thus at this point that it becomes clear the U.S. 
Department of Education’s policy guidance interpretation, while 
not carrying the force of law, is clearly at odds with the Gratz 
court. 
This reality raises several issues about whether the many 
restricted grants administered by universities may “cleanse’ 
themselves from putative suits alleging racial discrimination by 
virtue of their participation.  To address this question of liability, 
it is first necessary to tease out some of the conceptual 
distinctions in restricting financial aid allocation that might 
implicate potential bases for establishing state action. 
 
PART IV 
 
State Action & Title VI: 
Doctrinal Contradictions Abound 
 
Under the U.S. Department of Education’s Policy 
Guidance, a specific carve out exception for Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) permits these institutions to 
“participate in race-targeted programs for Black students 
established by third parties if the programs are not limited to 
Gratz with respect to the use of racial preferences. The implications of the 
Sandoval ruling are far reaching for civil rights groups as well as private 
litigants. Since the rights and remedies under the implementing regulations of 
Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 and Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (at C.F.R. Part 104) and Title IX of the Higher 
Education Amendments of 1972 (at C.F.R. Part 106) are the same as those 
under Title VI, the decision may have implications for disability and other civil 
rights litigants as well.  
50 Complicating the matter, however, is that complaints which may be 
filed directly with the U.S. Department of Education Office for Civil Rights 
(OCR), which under the policies of the Bush Administration will need to plead 
with enhanced particularity of facts that will support a disparate impact 
violation.50 This will mean private citizens will likely need the assistance of 
attorneys and other complainants to pool supportive collective statistical data 
to supplement their complaint allegations.  This data will need to include 
specific supportive numerical data and/or anecdotal testimony from 
competent witnesses knowledgeable about the adverse racial disparate impact 
that will supports the allegation of disparate impact. Absent the production of 
very specific evidence, OCR may be reluctant to investigate and enforce 
disparate impact complaints.  The result could be a smaller window for 
recourse. 
51 Bloom, supra note 6 at 500-501.  
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students at HBCUs.”52 This approach presumably preserves the 
mission of HBCUs to educate underrepresented African-
Americans so long as it does not institutionally monopolize the 
benefit of its efforts to create race-based scholarships.  There 
nonetheless remains an internal tension with the DOE’s policy 
guidance and its differential treatment of NVCC and a HBCU.   
As with NVCC, there is a doctrinal preoccupation not 
with the source of the funds, but with the university that merely 
administers it.  However, when a HBCU is involved in 
administering and participating in a race-based scholarship, the 
inquiry instead turns upon the affiliation status of scholarship 
recipients.  Why should the question of legality turn upon the 
dubious status as one’s affiliation with the participating HBCU?  
This apparent contradiction as to the manner in which 
NVCC is prohibited from administering race-based scholarships 
while HBCUs are precisely permitted to participate in the 
administration of these same types of scholarships can hardly be 
reconciled by the neutral observer.   Nor can the distinction 
hardly be explained as a matter of state action that arises with a 
public institution on the one hand, and a private institution such 
as an HBCU on the other that nonetheless receives federal 
funding sufficient to trigger Title VI.  One may perhaps conclude 
that this difficulty stems from the awkward attempt of the policy 
guidance to serve two masters so to speak. It attempts on the one 
hand to preserve institutional mission of HBCUs, while 
simultaneously seeking to cleanse any perceived institutional 
imprimatur on racial discrimination vis-à-vis the administration of 
a race-based scholarship.  Nonetheless, state action still remains a 
formidable obstacle for universities to overcome before allocating 
or simply administering race-based financial aid. Moreover, 
because Title VI has essentially incorporated the equal protection 
clause including its requirement of strict scrutiny, 53 the other 
formidable roadblock presented by such scholarships is the 
narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny.  
 
State Action & Strict Scrutiny Of Restricted Grants 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act may be triggered when 
an institution of higher learning selects a recipient for, or 
administers a race-based scholarship as such would constitute 
state action.54 In those instances where race-based grants are 
52 59 Fed. Reg. 8756-01 (Feb. 23, 1994). 
53 See Angelo N. Ancheta, Revisiting Bakke and Diversity-Based Admissions: 
Constitutional Law, Social Science Research, and the University of Michigan Affirmative 
Action Cases, March 2003, at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu. 
54 Mark Kantrowitz, Affirmative Action and Financial Aid, THE SMART 
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offered to university students, current law would behoove the 
college or university to contact donors to seek revisions to the 
terms of the scholarship to bring it into compliance with Gratz.55 
Rice University, for instance, has rejected racial restrictions on 
scholarships funds donated by its alumni.56 The problem, 
moreover, gets a bit thornier when the donor is deceased and 
donative intent may be frustrated.  In these cases, the institution 
would necessarily have to seek modification of the restricted gift 
in probate court.57 Absent these options, university officials may 
have little other choice than to transfer administration of the 
scholarship to completely into the hands of private institutions as 
those receiving Title VI funds would be similarly constrained by 
Gratz.58 
This was precisely the case with the Northern Virginia 
Community College (NVCC), which in response to a DOE 
complaint filed by a white student, was forced to transfer the 
administration of five private race-based scholarships out of 
university hands and back to the original donor.59 No longer 
could NVCC choose students for the scholarship, and its mission 
to serve as a feeder to four year institutions of higher education 
appeared to be frustrated.60 
In other instances, transfer of funds or the elimination 
of the program altogether may be mandated by state law.  For 
instance, California’s Proposition 209 forbids colleges and 
universities from administering aid grants to increase racial 
diversity. Other than closing down the aid program, transferring 
funds back to donors, or altering the selection criteria of 
scholarships, donative intent will ultimately remain frustrated in 
the vast majority of cases.61 
STUDENT GUIDE TO FINANCIAL AID, available at http://www.finaid.org/ 
educators/affirmativeaction.phtml 
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 The Department of Educations’ 1994 Policy Guidance does leave 
some wiggle room in this regard.  Principle 5—“Private Gifts Restricted By 
Race or national Origin”—“has been amended to clarify that a college can 
administer financial aid from private donors that is restricted on the basis of 
race or national origin only if that aid is consistent with the other principles in 
this policy guidance.” 
59 See Elizabeth Frengel, Using Race-Based Scholarships To Promote Campus 
Diversity, Community C.J., Dec. 1998/Jan. 1999, at 21.  
60 Amy Weir, Should Higher Education Race-based Financial Aid Be 
Distinguished From Race-based Admissions? available at http://infoeagle. 
bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/43_4/09_TXT.htm#T10 
61 There are some cases in factor where donative intent may be 
honored, although it is a matter of fortuitous timing. Funds received before 
August 28, 1997 would take priority over the statewide proposition. See 
Kantrowitz, supra note 46.  
2004]  Towards An Establishment Clause Theory  
 
16
To circumvent the difficulties that arise in these 
contexts, many institutions structure financial aid by a method 
commonly referred to as “pooling”. Pooling involves awarding 
facially neutral grants to all students on the basis of objective 
indicia such as grade point average and financial need for which 
matching funds would then be allocated from university coffers 
in accordance with specified donor preferences. This option 
permits compliance with both donor preferences and the Equal 
Protection Clause by relieving any undue burden upon students 
who do not meet the race-based eligibility requirements of race-
based scholarships.62 Nonetheless, no difficulty would arise with 
purely private scholarships such as the Gate Millennium 
Scholarship Fund and the United Negro College Fund so long as 
the college or university did not raise funds or provide resources 
for candidate selection.63
PART V 
 
Narrow Tailoring 
 
Despite this doctrinal obfuscation, what is pristinely 
unmistakable is that any incarnation of a narrowly tailored race-
conscious scholarship program would have to contain six 
indispensable characteristics so as not to transgress the strict 
scrutiny of equal protection racial discrimination analysis.  They 
are: (1) the individualized comparison of applicants—No 
minority candidate can be subjected to set aside, quota or dual 
tracks designed to shield minority candidates from the crucible of 
competition in the admission and financial aid process; (2) the 
absence of mechanistic formulas—No minority candidate may be 
given individual file consideration by virtue of the automatic 
operation of a quota or plus factor that is wholly deprived of 
undifferentiated  professional discretion and which renders race 
outcome determinative; (3) the goal of achieving a “critical mass” 
of under-represented minorities—Attempts to achieve a critical 
mass must clearly be noted in the mission statement and 
permeate admissions policy, registration, financial aid, program 
curriculum so as not to appear as sham lip service to racial 
diversity without adequate justification. It follows that officials 
must be prepared with documented institutional specific data, 
surveys, reports, expert summaries, alumni and student 
statements and empirical social science data available to properly 
62 Mark Kantrowitz, Affirmative Action and Financial Aid, THE SMART 
STUDENT GUIDE TO FINANCIAL AID, available at http://www.finaid.org/ 
educators/affirmativeaction.phtml 
63 Id. 
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buttress the benefits of diversity and its efforts to achieve a 
critical mass of underrepresented minorities64; (4) doing “no 
undue harm” to members of groups not favored by the system— 
Admissions and general counsel must be vigilant in considering 
to what extent special consideration of race may adversely affect 
other non-minorities or non-underrepresented minorities. It is 
rather hard to imagine an instance, however, when a financial aid 
package, more so than an admissions decision, would not unduly 
harm someone in the binary competition fought between those 
who ultimately receive financial aid and those who do not. 
However, the more careful and flexible admissions and financial 
officers are in opening up the notion of diversity, the less there is 
a viable basis for which non-recipients can claim an undue 
burden. This is because race-conscious financial aid does not, 
alone, necessarily dictate that a student would be foreclosed from 
attending a college solely on the basis of race.65 However any 
undue burden may also be mitigated and less intrusive if the pool 
of financial resources available to non-minority recipients of 
financial are much greater.66 Conversely, the burden might be 
minimized if the number of non-minority recipients is 
considerably small and diffuse.67 There is, however, another 
aspect that distinguishes financial aid from admissions that do 
not cause undue burden.  Further, should  any institution prefers 
to admit and fund African-Americans to Asian-Americans, for 
example, it ought to be prepared to demonstrate through 
statistical data and careful internal deliberations that it has 
properly reached a sound pedagogical judgment that the 
university has a sufficient representation of Asian-Americans on 
campus already; (5) a continuing exploration of race-neutral 
alternatives—periodic reviews of the use of race by admission 
officers and faculty are appropriate from admission cycle to 
admission cycle.  This does not mean, however, that a university 
is compelled to attempt, fail and exhaust every race-neutral 
alternative if it is not reasonably calculated to, or likely to yield, a 
sufficient number of minority students to constitute a critical 
mass admitted under selective criteria before employing race-
conscious consideration.68 All that is required is a serious “good 
64 See NACUA NOTES, (May 11, 2004), Vol. 2, No, 2. at 
http://ogc.arizona.edu/Race-Conscious%20 Financial%20Aid.htm 
65 Amy Weir, Should Higher Education Race-based Financial Aid Be 
Distinguished From Race-based Admissions? available at http://infoeagle. 
bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/lwsch/journals/bclawr/43_4/09_TXT.htm#T10. 
66 Arthur L. Coleman et al, Diversity In Higher Education: A Strategic 
Planning and Policy Manual Regarding Federal Law in Admissions, Financial Aid, and 
Outreach, 32, at www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/highered/ad/ 
014624WODiversutyHighrEdT.pdf 
67 59 Fed. Reg. 8756-01 (Feb. 23, 1994). 
68 As the majority in Grutter notes:  
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faith consideration of workable, race neutral alternatives that will 
achieve the diversity” that the institution seeks.69; (6) a realistic 
time limit— where deemed appropriate, the implementation of 
sunset provisions should occur when the continued use of race is 
found no longer to be necessary in order to achieve a critical 
mass.70 This point was further underscored by O’Connor in 
Grutter. The Court noted that it: 
 
[t]ake[s] the Law School at its word that it would 
“like nothing better than to find a race-neutral 
admissions formula” and will terminate its race-
conscious admissions program as soon as 
practicable. . . . [The Court] expect[s] that 25 
years from now, the use of  racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the 
interest approved today.71 
For the majority, the necessity for some finality to all 
race-conscious admissions programs “assure[s] all citizens that 
the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and 
ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the 
service of the goal of equality itself.”72 
However, while only race-based scholarships and 
financial aid will not pass constitutional muster under narrow 
tailoring analysis, it is clear that race-conscious scholarships may 
suffice provided the six characteristics previously noted are 
faithfully taken into account. To this end, a number of diversity 
factors such as the enthusiasm of the recommenders, the 
character of the undergraduate institution, the quality of the 
applicant's essay, the difficulty of undergraduate coursework, 
extracurricular activities, adversities overcome (i.e. illness, disease, 
parental or sibling death) languages spoken, international travels, 
good faith consideration does not entail, however, 
“exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral 
alternative” or force an institution between maintaining 
a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment 
to provide educational opportunities to members for all 
racial groups.  Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2344. 
69 Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2345. 
70 These factors are adapted from the Supreme Court’s opinions in 
Grutter and Gratz, as well as Michael Madden, U.S. Supreme Court Decisions in 
University of Michigan Admissions Cases, 1 NACUANOTE 5 (2 July 2003);  
Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2343, citing Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 318, n. 52.  
71 Grutter,123 S.Ct. at 2346. 
72 Id. (citing Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 
(1989))(plurality opinion); see also Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Casimir J. Bartnik, 
The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional 
Schools, 58 Chi. B. Rec. 282, 293 (1977).  
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geographical diversity, graduate degrees, military experience, work 
experience, veteran status, parental occupation, parental divorce, 
parental abuse, frequent family relocation, playing a musical 
instrument, drama, writing, painting, athletics, disability, 
orientation, gender, national origin, high poverty neighborhood, 
and the applicant's other potential to contribute to student 
diversity may all be considered in the selection process for 
scholarships.   
Another prudent strategy in devising financial aid is to 
require students wanting to be considered for diversity 
scholarships to write a “diversity of perspective personal 
statement” detailing how the student will contribute to the overall 
diversity and learning environment of the college and university.  
In this way, administrators are less likely to engage in 
impermissible racial stereotyping and are better able to assess that 
it is establishing a critical mass.  Moreover, such an approach 
would foster the requisite individualized consideration of each 
candidate admonished in Bakke and Gratz while subjecting each 
applicant for diversity scholarships to an unshielded, integrated, 
competitive process.  The use of a diversity of perspective 
personal statement is thus, the most prudent approach to 
achieving a critical mass.   
Moreover, under this proposed scenario, admissions 
officials will rely on a personal statement in the admissions 
process and a diversity of perspective personal statement for 
race-conscious diversity scholarships. Accordingly, it is proper to 
assume that the decisions to admit a minority applicant would 
both have been further imbued with professional judgments 
about the decision to award financial aid to that applicant on a 
basis of her diversity of perspective personal statement.   Seen in 
this way, financial aid is only a conduit by which to reinforce 
admissions offers that in turn may be designed to attract and 
recruit a critical mass of diversity.   
Therefore, it then stands to reason that a minority student 
who is admitted and given financial aid is twice the beneficiary of 
reasoned, careful consideration by university admissions staff that 
have reached a professional consensus that the students will make 
a positive contribution to the university.  As such, a university’s 
exercise of professional discretion to admit and fund a minority 
student is twice protected by the deference under the First 
Amendment right of academic freedom.  
Consequently, it may be of little consequence that a 
diversity conscious scholarship is administered in a race-sensitive 
fashion primarily to racial minorities so long as other non-
minorities receive a financial aid award as well.  Neither a 
Benjamin Banker Blacks-only scholarship that was at issue in 
Podberesky nor the Whites-only mock scholarship offered by a 
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Rogers and Williams College Republican student would appear to 
pass constitutional muster.73 In fact, it is questionable whether 
even universities could target certain ethnicities for scholarships, 
no matter how underrepresented they may be on college 
campuses across the nation unless the judgment to target the 
specific group is carefully documented and the undue burden 
upon non-beneficiaries is minimal. Accordingly, scholarship set 
asides like those at the University of North Carolina’s for only 
Native Americans are legally vulnerable on the same grounds the 
set asides of seats at U.C. Davis Medical School in Bakke or
subcontracting set-aside programs in Croson.74 Moreover, UNC’s 
approach is also wanting as it is ultimately not likely to yield the 
desired results for Native Americans precisely because their own 
representation may be called into question by groups such as 
Latinos, West Indians, and African-Americans.   
In this regard, one can see quite clearly how the words of 
Justice Scalia in Grutter gradually starts to take on ominous 
importance when he warns: “Finally, litigation can be expected 
on behalf of minority groups intentionally short changed in the 
institution’s composition of its generic minority ‘critical mass.’  I 
do not look forward to any of these cases.”75 In fact, it is this 
generic “Black” minority status that can lead to further litigation 
among Native Black Americans attempting to procure the same 
affirmative action opportunities that West Indians and African 
immigrants have received at some of our nation’s most selective 
institutions.  
This eventuality take on new life when one considers that 
that the descendants of American slaves comprise a minority of 
West Indian and African immigrants who actually benefit from 
affirmative action.  These groups, their children and the children 
of biracial couples represented the largest portion of Blacks 
admitted to the most selective institutions of higher education.76 
Recent research confirms that on average, West Indians account 
for more than forty-one percent of all “Blacks” at twenty eight 
selective institutions including Harvard University, Columbia 
University, Duke University, University of Pennsylvania and the 
University of California at Berkeley.  This forty-one percent 
73 Elissa Gootman, Scholarship, 'Whites Only,' Roils a Campus, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 17, 2004, at A17. 
74 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) 
(invalidating a subcontracting set-aside program intended to remedy effects of 
racial discrimination for not serving a compelling purpose and not being 
narrowly tailored under the Equal Protection Clause).  
75 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia,  J., dissenting). 
76 See Sara Rimer and Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, 
But Which Ones? N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004 available at www.nytimes. 
com/2004/06/24/education/24AFFI.final.html?ex=1403409600&en=92d 
f04e0957d73d3&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND 
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identified themselves as immigrants, children of immigrants, or as 
mixed race.77 Given the tension that has arisen over this new 
revelation, it would come as no surprise that, as Justice Scalia 
further predicts, “other suits may claim that the institution’s racial 
preferences have gone below or above the mystical-Grutter 
approved critical mass.’”78 Just as Native Black Americans will 
seek recourse for the preferred status of immigrants, so too will 
the preferred status of Blacks in admissions become the predicate 
by which either Latinos or Native Americans will challenge the 
suit.  Further, with Asians, Asian-Americans and Caucasian 
women being among the greatest beneficiaries of affirmative 
action, it might be reasonable to expect that another inter-group 
conflict this time with West Indians, Africans, and biracial person 
is inevitable.    
Michigan’s focus on truly underrepresented minorities, 
however, has been upheld as laudable among universities that too 
often struggle to attract and education underrepresented Native 
Americans, African-Americans and Latinos. An admissions 
decision to focus solely on underrepresented minorities may very 
well be imbued with the professional discretion and judgment 
deserving judicial deference.79 The problem may arise, however, 
whenever a university may appear to arbitrarily draw artificial 
lines of preference between favoring one deserving 
underrepresented racial group while ignoring a similarly situated 
underrepresented group.  In such an instance, a reviewing court 
may be wary of placing its imprimatur on what it may see as an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, and unsupported distinction between 
Native Americans and African-Americans for instance.  Here, it is 
unlikely that documentation would be as much help as where the 
distinction is between an underrepresented group like Latinos 
and an often over-represented group like Asian-Americans.80 
These difficulties only further buttress an approach where private 
donor, race-based, restricted grants is seen as the most targeted 
means to recruit underrepresented minority groups since the 
77 These numbers are consistent with other reported findings by 
sociologist studying this issue:  
Douglas S. Massey, a Princeton sociology professor who was one of the 
researchers, said the black students from immigrant families and the mixed-
race students represented a larger proportion of the black students than that in 
the black population in the United States generally. Andrew A. Beveridge, a 
sociologist at Queens College, says that among 18- to 25-year-old blacks 
nationwide, about 9 percent describe themselves as of African or West Indian 
ancestry. Like the Gates and Guinier numbers, these tallies do not include 
foreign students. Sara Rimer and Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More 
Blacks, But Which Ones?, supra note 75.  
78 Id.
79 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003) (discussing the  
Court's deference to a school's "educational mission" and judgments). 
80 Bloom, supra note 6 at 500-01. 
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grants themselves have not been provided by the university, but 
by private individuals.  
 
PART VI 
 
A Right To Be Preferred? 
 
An unanswered question that arises in the Grutter and 
Gratz cases is whether a disfavored racial group would ever have 
a constitutional right to a preference in admissions schemes, and 
by extension, a preference in the award of financial aid 
scholarship and grants under a race plus approach.  The principal 
doctrinal arsenal on each side can be gleaned with some 
imagination. For instance, it is not hard to conjure a situation 
where second generation students of southeast Asian Indian 
Hindu parents and Pakistani Muslim students challenge a 
preference to admit native Black Americans.  On a plus factor 
analysis, one might say that the former may even bring more 
diversifying factors to the table than the latter.  Whether it is 
linguistic diversity, religious diversity, national origin, political 
point of view diversity, international travel, color, etc., we might 
very well conceive a scenario where an Indian or Pakistani might 
rank higher on the scale of these various diversifying factors than 
the native Black American.  Of course, the rebuttal on the other 
side is also not hard to conceive. Here, it would be argued that 
individualized consideration means something more than “adding 
all the sum total of all the parts” approach that is devoid of 
meaningful discretion and holistic whole file consideration.  
Perhaps the Pakistani ranks higher on a number of statistical 
indicators, but individualized consideration would look at 
character and a voice that is distinctly missing from class debates, 
moot court briefs, law review notes and the alumni and 
professional practicing community of a law school, university or 
college.  Individualized consideration means in this context what 
contribution can this student make, and will likely make, to the 
overall educational community, both nationally and in state.81 
81 In this regard, it is significant that Justice Thomas applauds the 
success of Wayne State University Law School in educating students in the 
state of Michigan than the university that bears its namesake.   Thomas 
appeared to suggest that there can be such a thing as too much diversity when 
it comes at the expense of an institution’s own mission. This is a slightly 
different argument than suggesting that the implicit choice is between diversity 
and selectivity.  There is but no question that the University of Michigan is 
widely regarded a more selective institution than Wayne State, but as Justice 
Thomas notes, the University of Texas maintains its reputation as a selective 
institution while educating, by state legislative mandate, resident Texans in half 
of its entering class seats.  The choice need not be mutually exclusive, although 
there may be in the end little choice depending upon the qualifying 
characteristics of local demographics from which to constitute an entering 
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Individual consideration then, is not just a science, but an art 
form requiring careful, intuitive judgment gleaned from faculty 
recommendations and at some Ivy League institutions, personal 
interviews.  The counterpoint, one could argue, is that Gratz does 
not prohibit quantification or numerical value assignment on 
diversifying factors, only the automatic and determinative 
assignment of value on the basis of race.82 
Moreover, diversity is a moving target, which is in 
constant flux depending upon the demographics of entering 
classes.  In instances where religious diversity is adequately 
supported in a critical mass, then diversity may mean something 
qualitatively and quantitatively different in successive admissions 
cycles where perhaps it is appropriate to look instead at other 
diversifying factors such adversities overcome, discrimination 
surmounted, etc.  There is little difficulty with this approach 
because while it may attract more native Blacks than Indians, it 
does not guarantee an outcome.  Indeed, an Eritrean or Liberian 
that has escaped civil war in their home country to emigrate to 
American and learn a new language will fare well in the 
assessment of diversifying factors, but it does not foreclose the 
consideration of language minority Latinos or African-Americans 
who have endured daily struggles of discrimination as well.  
Moreover, even though there may be a clear preference for 
underrepresented minorities such as Native Americans, Latinos 
or Blacks in admission and financial aid, it does not necessarily 
mean that a critical mass of these groups will actually be achieved 
or retained on campus. The revelations that immigrants, Africans 
and biracial persons are the beneficiaries of affirmative action 
more so than native Black Americans is a strong testament of this 
fact.   That said, it may be prudent, as one commentator suggest, 
that similarly situated groups be given “parity of treatment rather 
than simply assuming that the courts will defer to whatever the 
university decides to do.”83 
student body. Perhaps then, what Thomas suggests is a notion that 
individualized consideration that ask this fundamental question: will this 
individual contribute to the school’s mission to educate members of the state 
bar or future doctors and consultants for the state or region?  The problem 
arises when universities in states with low a low number of resident minorities 
that may have no choice but to recruit from out of state.  In these instances, 
however, we learn that diversity is fluid and always in flux.  Where in state 
students are adequately represented, a new characteristic may become a 
diversifying factor.    
82 See Reaffirming Diversity: A Legal Analysis of the University of Michigan 
Affirmative Action Cases, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 19 available at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/policy/legal_docs/Diversity_ %20 
Raffirmed.pdf 
83 Bloom, supra note 6 at 501. 
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All of these complex issues nonetheless speak to the need 
for further nuance and sophistication in how admissions staff 
chose to diversity their faculty.  No longer is it acceptable for 
admissions staff to lump such a diffuse number of distinct racial  
groups such as persons from Jamaica, Trinidad, Dominica, 
Guyana, Barbados, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, St. 
Kitts/Nevis, Antigua, Cape Verde, Kenya, Eritrea, and Nigeria 
under the rubric “Black” or “African-American” in order to 
diversity their student body.  Likewise, the same would apply to 
those that fall within the generic “Latino” or “language minority” 
categories but nonetheless hail from areas as diverse as the 
Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Mexico, Costa Rica, 
Venezuela,  Brazil, El Salvador, Argentina and Columbia.  Each 
bring their own unique perspective and we would continue to do 
a great disservice to ignore such a heterogeneous assortment of 
backgrounds all for the sake of a shallow conception of what 
constitutes diversity.  Likewise, we would do a great disservice to 
include every diffuse groups by sacrificing or ignoring long 
underrepresented racial groups whose voice and presence have 
been excluded from the hallowed halls of academia. Moreover, 
there is nothing legally suspect with a suggestion that admission 
offices be mindful of such racial, ethnic, cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds of admitted applicants. In fact, if the Court agrees 
that closely monitoring acceptance of offers of admission 
extended to minority students, will not give rise to an inference 
that the institution is maintaining a quota, neither should it if an 
admissions office closely monitors the specific racial background 
of those that fall within the generic “Black” and “Latino” 
nomenclatures.84 
Indeed, the way an institution largely satisfies the 
requirement of narrow tailoring is by taking account of all 
relevant diversifying factors, including ethnicity, national origin 
and color, in an individualized and competitive process in both 
the admissions and financial aid decisions of a college or 
university.  Of course, I would even say that we fall short of the 
individualized consideration required under Gratz if we were to 
maintain the current status quo of minority student selection used 
at institutions such as Harvard University, Columbia University, 
Duke University, University of Pennsylvania and the University 
of California at Berkeley which fail to take into account 
differences in “Black” heritage and underrepresented racial 
groups.  
 
PART VII 
 
Underrepresentation & Critical Mass 
84 See Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2343.  
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Yet as we know from Chief Justice Rehnquist cynical 
questioning of Michigan College of Literature, Science, and the 
Arts (LSA) counsel, John Payton, during oral argument, a group 
can only be underrepresented if there is a benchmark by which to 
measure the purported deficiency of representative numbers.85
Otherwise, how do we know any particular racial minority is 
underrepresented?  
Unfortunately, something more than a Justice Stewart’s “I 
know it when I see it” approach is required to answer this critical 
question. The principle difficulty in abiding with the rules of this 
logic is that it is designed to fall on its own sword if one is not 
careful.  For instance, anything that might look like a benchmark 
by which one is able to say with any mathematical certitude a 
racial group is underrepresented may be a standard, which might 
appear dangerously close to the functional equivalent of a 
disguised quota. But as Justice Powell noted: “there is of course 
‘some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits 
to be derived from a diverse student body and the between the 
numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those 
students admitted.”86 To say that some group is 
underrepresented is to say that there is some level of 
representation that one numerically ought to be entitled to have on 
campus.  That, to critics, may very well look like a quota.  A 
quota is a program in which a fixed number or proportion of 
opportunities that “must be met or cannot be exceeded is 
reserved exclusively for certain minority groups.”87 Likewise, for 
some it may appear that the practical difference between a racial 
quota and “a numerical aspiration” as nothing more than adept 
slight of hand. Not quite so.   
For instance, in Grutter it was shown that 
underrepresented minority graduates ranged from as low as 5.4% 
in 1998 to a high just four year earlier of 19.2%.88 As we now 
85 Id. 
86 Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 at 323.  
87 Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2342 (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 
478 U.S. 421, 495 (1986)(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
88 Though the range varied considerably, the mean percentage of 
underrepresented minority students from 1986 to 1999 was 12.6%. See 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 739-42 (6th Cir. 2001); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
137 Supp.2d 821, 870 (2001) n. 26. As the district court noted in the original 
Michigan admission policy, it stated clearly that:  
“…we seem to have achieved the kinds of benefits that 
we associate with racial and ethnic diversity from 
classes in which the proportion of African-American, 
Hispanic and Native American members has been 
between about 11% and 17% of total enrollees.  
Id. at 21. 
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know in light of Grutter, a good faith effort to “come within a 
range demarcated by the goal itself and permits consideration of 
race as a ‘plus’ factor” can serve as a permissible numerical 
aspiration that may rise or fall in a given year.89 With this in mind, 
Professor Bloom suggests some common sense benchmarks as a 
place to measure critical mass: 
 
“Representation might be judged by 
comparison to the group's percentage in the 
national population or its population in the 
state or city in which the institution is located, 
to a percentage in the school's applicant pool 
or percentage in the national applicant pool, 
to the percentage admissible without the use 
of racial preferences, or to the percentage of 
admitted members who choose to attend if 
admitted without racial preferences 
…Arguably, the most appropriate comparison 
would  be between the percentage of a 
particular minority group's members in the 
applicant pool and the percentage of that 
group admissible in the absence of racial 
preferences.”90 
This last suggestion of a possible benchmark appears not only to 
be supported by Croson’s observation, as Bloom notes, that a 
nonqualified pool would be of little significance as a basis of 
comparison.  It also appears to be supported by Grutter’s 
admonition that the use of racial preferences be used only when 
necessary, for a limited time and only when race-neutral 
alternatives do not promise to yield a diverse student body. In 
fact, only by comparing racial groups in the applicant pool to the 
percentage of that group admissible without racial preferences do 
we truly come to see the need for race-conscious considerations. 
If for instance, the percentage of those minority groups 
admissible without so called racial preferences in the overall 
applicant pool is significantly lower to the point that a critical 
mass cannot possibly be sustained without the benefit of such 
consideration, then we know that the use of race-conscious 
considerations are warranted for the admission cycle.  
 
PART VIII 
 
Three Proposals For Race Conscious and Race Based 
Financial Aid Allocations 
89 Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2342. 
90 Bloom, supra note 6 at 500. 
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Once the admissions offer is extended, there are three 
principle ways in which financial aid may be allocated to achieve 
this critical mass of underrepresented racial minorities. The first 
approach represents the least legally vulnerable doctrinal 
approach under current interpretations of Grutter and Gratz, 
while the last two approaches represent normative theoretical 
proposals to allocate financial aid in a pure race-based fashion. 
These three approaches include: (1) employing race-plus 
considerations in holistic race-conscious allocation 
determinations of financial aid. The analysis for consideration of 
race-conscious financial aid would likewise mirror the analysis for 
admission under Grutter and Gratz. This approach is the one most 
likely to be endorsed by the courts; (2) allocating race-based 
financial aid directly from university funding while maintaining 
race-conscious admissions process under Grutter and Gratz.  This 
approach attempts to distinguish the financial aid context apart 
from the admissions context at issue in the Bollinger cases; (3) 
administering race-based financial aid selecting recipients for 
private donor, race-restricted, grants while maintaining race-
conscious admissions process under Grutter. This approach 
attempts to offer a theoretical alternative to the current policy 
guidance provided by the U.S. Department of Education that 
often is filled with internal contradiction in application. I discuss 
these three approaches in turn below.  
 
(1) Race Conscious Allocation As A Plus Factor 
 
What I propose here is a multi-step step analysis to be 
conducted by a joint admissions and financial aid office staff. The 
analysis begins by first asking, is there a critical mass of racial 
minorities, both underrepresented and those of various national 
origins admissible without race-conscious consideration after 
subjecting each applicant to full competition in a one track 
admission review process? If so, there is no need for race 
conscious consideration in the admission process.  If not, race 
conscious consideration is warranted. A race plus factor approach 
is permissible.  Once the admission offer is extended, admissions 
staff should ask whether the number of minority students that 
have accepted the offer and matriculated constitute a critical 
mass.  If so, is there a critical mass of students and there is no 
need for the distribution of race-conscious financial aid (at least 
in the entering year. The analysis may be repeated in order to 
retain those upper-class minority students already on campus).  If 
not, there is a need for individualized consideration of race-
conscious scholarships and financial aid to recruit and attract a 
diverse critical mass that would actually exist in the classroom.   
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What might have looked like a diverse entering class 
may no longer be the case if minority students ate unable to 
attend because of costs.  In other words, the entering class is 
threatened to become less diverse without the consideration of 
race as a plus factor in financial aid allocations. Therefore, in 
order to determine financial aid recipients, finance office staff, in 
conjunction with admissions staff, might require each applicant 
to write a “diversity of perspective” essay or personal statement 
that would take into account all the diversifying factors for the 
competitive allocation of financial resources including the 
consideration of race.  In this fashion, all recipients are placed in 
the cauldron of competition on equal footing with no set asides.  
Each competes for resources in a matter that will be upheld as 
sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional strict scrutiny.  
 
(2) University Funded Race-Based Scholarships 
Another approach that is admittedly all but certain in 
light of Gratz is to distinguish the financial aid context distinctly 
altogether from the admission context.  In so doing, the doctrinal 
reach of Grutter and Gratz would be limited as universities and 
colleges could take into account race more freely in order to 
achieve a critical mass of underrepresented minorities.  But how 
is this theoretically possible in light of Grutter and Gratz? In fact, 
the majority in Grutter recognized that strict scrutiny must be 
applied within the specific context or program in question.  As 
the court noted, the narrow tailoring “inquiry must be calibrated 
to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve 
student body diversity.”91 Accordingly, calibration might in fact 
differ in the financial aid context than the admission aid context 
to address the distinct issues of race and financial need in order 
to achieve a student body. To this end, a university must 
demonstrate “that the means chosen fit the compelling goals 
closely. As the Supreme Court has noted, the fit need not be 
perfect, but it must be reasonable and it must “represent not 
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in 
proportion to the interest served.”92 It is possible by re-
conceptualizing race based financial aid not as a set aside.   
When the admissions context ends, it is clearer that all 
Blacks, Native Americans and Latinos have competed in a one-
tier track admissions process. Thus, the very fact that racial 
minorities have successfully competed for a seat does not render 
financial aid a set aside when its principal aim is to allow the 
student remain in that earned seat.  This is qualitatively different 
from reserving seats in the admissions process as was the issue in 
91 Grutter,123 U.S. at 2341.  
92 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995). 
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Bakke. In Bakke, special candidates in a separate admissions 
program were not required to meet the 2.5 grade point average 
cutoff and were not ranked against candidates in the general 
admission process although sixteen seats were reserved. Nor is it 
qualitatively the same as permitting contract set asides as in 
Croson that were not subjected to the full unprotected process of  
competitive bidding.   
Finally, the very fact that the university funded, race-
based scholarship would not purport on its terms to compensate 
for past discrimination places it on different constitutional 
footing than the Benjamin Banneker scholarship at issue in 
Podberesky. There, it was clear that the race-exclusive scholarship  
suffered from, inter alia, the constitutional defect of insufficient 
narrow tailoring precisely because it posed an undue burden to 
non-beneficiaries, to wit: non-African-Americans.   
But even on this ground, the university funded race 
based scholarship still presents no such concern.  Financial aid 
packages are set based upon information that is compiled by the 
Free Application For Federal Student Aid (FAFSA).93 Given the 
fact that most schools will reduce their financial aid funds in 
direct proportion to funds a student receives from the federal 
government, one commentator wonders whether Podberesky 
himself would not have seen his race-exclusive scholarship 
reduced or received some other form of aid.94 When there is 
such an offsetting mechanism in university financial aid based 
upon a greater amount of federal funds received, it is quite 
difficult to say that one has been unduly burdened by virtue of 
the scholarship solely because of their race.  Moreover, this type 
of compensatory offsetting in financial benefits is wholly 
different in character from the zero sum battle for an admission 
seat that was denied Jennifer Gratz and Allan Bakke.   
 
A Question Of Merit? 
 
Moreover, it is questionable whether an undue burden 
test should apply in the financial aid context.  One fundamental 
distinction worth noting between admissions and financial aid, is 
that in the former, there is an expectation that good grades, good 
test cores and a competitive showing on other supposed 
“objective” criteria will be awarded in the form of an admissions 
offer.  To some extent this may also be true of what is referred to 
as “merit” scholarships.   
93 See Focus on Financial Aid: The Basics, Steps to College (Jan/Feb. 
2001) available at http://www. nacac.com/p&s_steps.html.  
94 Amy Weir, Should Higher Education Race-based Financial Aid Be 
Distinguished From Race-based Admissions?, supra note 59. 
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The notion of merit as one’s demonstrated ability or 
achievement is but one basis for judicial deference to a university 
driven mission where the value of diversity is an alternative, but 
legitimate, aim.  As opposed to “merit”, the notion of value in 
this context signifies a sense of worth in usefulness or importance 
to the university.  Therefore, the university is best able to 
determine how to pursue policies, and allocate aid, in a manner 
that consistently reflects these institutional values. Thus, whereas 
the intrinsic conception of merit exist entirely in the domain of 
individual capacity to leverage academic ability or achievement, it 
is an incomplete picture.  For when we say there is an extrinsic 
value to diversity, we are essentially saying that value is always 
relative to the utility and significance any given candidate brings 
to the table.  But even here, the distinction collapses very often in 
the admissions context. But it also in the context of financial aid 
decisions where the value of an applicant to a college or university 
determiners whether and to what extent a prospective candidate 
may receive merit-based aid.  There is still little in the way of a 
definitive entitlement.  
To further illustrate this proposition, consider the 
following scenario between two students: Student A and Student 
B. 
 
Distinguishing Race-Based Considerations 
In The Admissions and Financial Aid Contexts 
 
Student A is a Caucasian male history teacher at Taft, a 
prestigious predominantly white boarding school in New 
England and a graduate of Princeton University summa cum laude 
and Student B, a female minority calculus teacher at an inner city 
school who graduated from Hostos Community College and City 
College, is known to work well with a diverse set of students. In 
an admission context, it is clear Student A is meritorious and will 
likely be admitted.  It is also clear that Student B is technically 
qualified and is also admissible under eligibility criteria. But it 
remains uncertain whether Student A has “value” in the same 
sense as Student B in a graduate school of education whose 
institutional mission is deeply rooted in educating the 
surrounding inner city community that has important historic ties 
to the university’s founding. The value of Student B, 
notwithstanding credentials, may be greater than Student A where 
there is a diverse racial demographic of learners and a dearth of 
upper-level math teachers in the local community where 
graduates of the school are desperately needed. Student B would 
be a better “fit” with the institutional values of the graduate 
school than Student A who statistically is less likely to teach in 
the local community upon graduation or whose record of 
teaching experience indicates he would not be as effective 
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teaching in a classroom filled with racially and ethnically diverse 
math students.  
However, in the financial aid context, a different set of 
considerations may govern in a good faith attempt to achieve a 
critical mass.  Student A is able to pay ¾ of his annual tuition. It 
is apparent that Student B, on the other hand, has communicated 
she is simply not able to attend without scholarship and 
fellowship support. General institutional funds available for need-
based and female undergraduate math majors are not sufficient to 
offer Student B a full ride while still being capable to provide aid 
to other students in need.  In fact, it is clear that while Student B 
would need a full grant in order to matriculate, a great number of 
other non-minority, male and female students would need the 
same amount as well. Student B would qualify for the only 
additionally available funds: (1) a race-based university 
administered scholarship offered by a private donor and; (2)   
funds that are potentially available to Student B as a race-
exclusive scholarship if the law permits it.  Are there different 
considerations in taking race into account the same in the 
financial and context than in the admissions context?  Should 
Grutter and Gratz be extended to financial aid scenarios like these 
playing out across the nation? Is there a basis for a distinction in 
financial aid that would permit the university to dedicate the lion 
share of institutional funding of race based aid to Student B while 
not allocating a similar amount to Student A? 
The above scenario indicates that in the grand expanse 
of financial aid that may include scholarships, there remains no 
single entitlement to aid based upon some universal notion of 
merit and value.  No one is guaranteed or entitled to receive 
financial aid.  Accordingly, it is hard to argue that one has been 
unduly burden by the denial of financial aid solely because of 
their race.  Many factors may play into the decision to award and 
not to award aid that an expectation that one is entitled to receive 
a general institutional grant may be regarded as unreasonable. 
Further, a college or university may decide to extend funds based 
upon athletic ability, linguistic skill, Scottish lineage, 
undergraduate major, left handed dexterity and a host of other 
bases that are likely to exclude many minorities in a manner that 
is sure to unduly burden some.  Yet, it can hardly be said that 
these minority non-beneficiaries are excluded from financial aid 
as a whole on the basis of their race.  Likewise, the same applies 
to white students who may inconveniently fall outside the 
purview of these scholarship eligibility criteria.  
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Discretion, Legitimacy & Selectivity 
 
More so than in the admission scheme, the award of 
financial aid is a matter of greater institutional discretion and the 
discretion of scholarship donors.  Alumni, research foundations, 
fellowship programs, national and regional professional 
associations as well fortune 500 companies such as those featured 
in the “3-M Brief” may very well grant restricted and unrestricted 
discretionary funds to learning institutions that will ultimately 
comprise a reserve pool of university funded scholarships and 
university administered scholarships.  In the exercise of its 
reasoned discretion, many donors may well conclude that the 
contribution of funds or the allocation thereof  best represents 
what they believe are the best return on its investment. That 
judgment should not be impinged upon or frustrated merely 
because of judicial interference. Furthermore, for universities, an 
additional layer of discretion permeates decisions in the allocation 
of funds, whether donated or even if the monies are directly 
fundraised by university official themselves in order to execute its 
own policies. Thus, financial aid allocations may very well 
embody a policy to fund students it believes may potentially 
contribute to a skilled, but underrepresented workforce more 
generally and perhaps to the workforce of these donors in 
particular.  In any case, the policy judgment of donors and 
universities require a modicum of judicial restraint when it comes 
to how these important institutions achieve racial diversity 
through financial aid.  
But if the exercise of professional and academic 
discretion in the allocation of grants are not enough to accord 
judicial deference, intrusive judicial oversight in the use of race in 
financial aid is troubling for yet another reason.  Just as students 
do not possess a legal guarantee or entitlement to financial aid, 
neither do they have such a guarantee when it comes to how 
much a student may receive of financial aid.  For the judiciary to  
second guess whether “Student A” should in fact have receive 
more grant funds than Student B” or an equal amount would 
embroil the bench  in the policy judgments that go to the core of 
a university’s institutional mission and autonomy and its entitled 
deference to achieving the real pedagogical benefits of diversity.   
This last component is of critical importance.  
Observers will recall Grutter’s pronounced discussion of the 
“real” benefit of race-based diversity, rather than mere 
“theoretical,” to wit, it yields a credible legitimacy when national 
leadership is diverse.95 Justice O’Connor writes: 
 
95 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340. 
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In order to cultivate a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is 
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly 
open to talented and qualified individuals of 
every race and ethnicity. All members of our 
heterogeneous society must have confidence 
in the openness and integrity of the 
educational institutions that provide this 
training.96 
Education is key to national legitimacy because, for O’Connor, 
it provides the training ground for a diverse national leadership 
to develop.  This diverse leadership in turn fosters a sense of 
legitimacy of a democratic nation that reflects all of its 
citizens.97 Accordingly, the critical mass analysis must be 
performed twice to ensure that of those admitted, there is an 
actual critical mass or racial minorities who can afford to 
remain on campuses through scholarships as this is the only 
way universities can ever begin “to cultivate a set of leaders.”   
Therefore, the question of legitimacy extends not only 
to ensuring a diverse set of national leaders, but to the very 
institutions themselves that are charged with the responsibility 
to create those leaders.  In declaring that “all members of our 
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness 
and integrity of the educational institutions”, O’Connor 
indicates that legitimacy is not just on the macro level of 
national leadership, but it also implicates the micro level of 
individual feeder institutions.  This important legitimacy, in 
turn, engenders a parallel level of accountability that rests on 
each individual institution to fulfill it commitment to educate 
every American of every hue, national origin and race, both as a 
democratic and economic matter.   Accordingly, when viewed 
in this way, it is clear why Michigan chose not to simply lower it 
admissions standards as Sacalia suggested.  
Scalia nonchalantly stated to Michigan Law School 
counsel, Ms. Mahoney:  
 
“Now, if Michigan really cares enough about 
that racial imbalance, why doesn't it do as 
many other State law schools do, lower the 
96 Id. at 2341. 
97 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 at 312-313 
(Powell, J., concurring)(quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 
603 (1967))(“[T]he ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many 
peoples.” 
2004]  Towards An Establishment Clause Theory  
 
34
standards, not have a flagship elite law school, 
it solves the problem."98 
But query whether it does. If, as is suggested above, there is 
indeed a macro and micro level of legitimacy concerns, and if 
there is a direct nexus between the legitimacy of national 
leaders and those of feeder institutions respectfully, then it is a 
non sequiter to suggest that simply lowering the standards “will 
solve the problem.”  The fact remains that the legitimacy of 
future national leaders a university may produce depends in no 
small measure upon the confidence we put into the institution’s 
legitimacy that produced these leaders in the first instance. 
Therefore, a university that lowers its standards may very well 
be less respected in leadership circles and in global markets. In 
a way that undermines the needed legitimacy of our leaders of 
color.   
The ramifications of Scalia’s suggestion to lower 
standards also means the military will have less educationally 
prepared officers to assume leadership reigns that became such 
a critical concern of several prominent retired military generals. 
The idea is that because racial diversity will ensure broad 
legitimacy in a racially and ethnically diverse world, the face of 
America must resemble those of its officer core (and other 
nations that have long seen their interest diametrically opposed 
to our own).  The group of twenty-nine retired military and 
civilian leaders, included General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, 
who directed the allied forces in the 1991 Gulf War, Robert 
McFarlane, who was President Reagan's national security 
adviser, Admiral William T. Crowe, who was chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1985 to 1989, and General Wesley 
Clark, who was Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from 
1997 to 2000. These military officers also took note of the 
nexus between legitimacy and racial diversity: 
 
In the interest of national security, the 
military must be selective in admissions for 
training and education for the officer corps, 
and it must train and educate a highly 
qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a 
racially diverse educational setting. It 
requires only a small step from this analysis 
to conclude that our country’s other most 
selective institutions must remain both 
diverse and selective. Like our military 
98 See United States Supreme Court Transcript at 30-31, Grutter (No. 
02- 241) (Oral Argument of Maureen E. Mahoney for Respondents Lee 
Bollinger et al.) 
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security, our economic security and 
international competitiveness depend upon 
it. An alternative that does not preserve 
both diversity and selectivity is no 
alternative at all.99 
In their brief, it is clear that the generals comprehend the dual 
nature of preserving diversity without sacrificing selectivity and 
international competitiveness in the same manner that Ms. 
Mahoney and the prestigious corporations in the 3-M Brief also 
suggest.  On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices 
Scalia and Thomas’s response seems to suggest that these twin 
aims are mutually exclusive. Perhaps they are. However, it is also 
logical to assume that sacrificing entry standards of flagship 
institutions altogether as they suggest will do more to harm global 
competitiveness, multicultural competence and national security  
overall than to give only a plus factor consideration to racial 
diversity.  If there were any rebutting arguments or evidence to 
suggest this would not result from disregarding selectivity and 
diversity, it was not forthcoming from these skeptical justices.   
Moreover, as discussed earlier, race neutral alternatives hardly 
promise at this current time to be effective in attracting racial 
minorities as it does poor whites. Thus, without a race-conscious 
scholarship program, universities may fail to adhere to their 
inherit democratic function to educate all racial groups. But even 
here, it remains an open question whether even marginally 
weightier race-conscious plus factors can even lead to the 
meaningful critical mass numbers in the final analysis when 
among other diversifying factors are calculated in the applicant 
pool.100 
Indeed, one primary economic justification for tax 
exemption of colleges and universities under market failure 
theory is relevant to the military generals and O’Connor’s 
diversity concerns because education is viewed as a public good 
which is not democratically distributed to all.101 In essence, the 
subsidy the federal government extends by recognition of tax 
exempt status to higher education institutions is an important 
recognition of their importance to educate leaders and an 
informed citizenry.102 Therefore, arguably universities fulfill their 
99 See Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. at 29-
30, Grutter (No. 02-241).  
100 Bloom, supra note 6, at 504-05.  
101 See Lester M. Salmon, AMERICA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER 
7-9 (1992).  
102 This is the classic justification under “subsidy theory”, see H.R. Rep. 
No. 75-1860, at 19 (3d Sess. 1938) See also Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of 
the Federal Income Tax Exemption For Charitable Organizations: A Theory 
Of Risk Compensation, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 419 (1998) (recounting that the 
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core tax exempt function by broadening the opportunity to a 
racially and economically diverse community of learners 
otherwise not served.103 The reciprocal obligation, therefore, of 
colleges and universities is to utilize its own grants and 
scholarships to further advance its institutional mission of 
campus diversity. Naturally, just as the government extends by 
recognition tax exempt status to higher education institutions as 
evidence of its mission to educate diverse students, the university 
extends by recognition financial aid to underrepresented minority 
students as evidence of its endorsement of diversity as an 
institutional commitment.   
 
PART IX 
 
Race-Based Administered Funds  
 
That an institution subjects itself to liability merely by 
administering a race-based scholarship appears draconian in 
application.  In these cases, it is not necessarily its own funds that 
have been called into question.  Nor is the source of those funds 
what renders the scholarship constitutionally suspect under the 
DOE’s formulation.  As discussed earlier, DOE’s formulation is 
inconsistent with the Bollinger cases on a number of levels.  
However, another important inconsistency is worth discussing 
here. The very fact that Grutter permits some form of race as a 
factor in administering an admissions program suggest that a 
university may also lawfully administer a financial aid program 
that similarly uses race.  Whether this proposition would extend 
to restricted race-exclusive scholarships, however, remains 
uncertain in light of Gratz, but common sense suggests that it 
should. Why should a university potentially target itself for 
lawsuits for administering race-based scholarship when the race-
based preference reflects the donative intent of private donors 
rather than the university itself.  To be sure, concerns that a 
university may endorse or place its imprimatur on unlawful racial 
discrimination is the principle operative concern animating such a 
rule.  Yet it is clear in other legal context that this incidental 
exemption from taxation is based upon the theory that the Government is 
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which 
would otherwise have to be met by appropriation of public funds, and by the 
benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.  See also 
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.Supp. 448, 456, (D.D.C. 1972)(“[T]he 
Government relieves itself of the burden of meeting public needs which in the 
absence of charitable activity would fall on the shoulders of the 
Government.”)  
103 See also Should Race Count? A Policy Discussion On The Future of 
Affirmative Action, Century Foundation, at http://www.tcf.org/ Events/ 
033103_AA/transcript.pdf. 
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administration of funds simply does not give rise to liability. In 
the Establishment Clause context, for instance where tax dollars 
are diverted to colleges and universities often reflected an 
institutional commitment, the question of endorsement arose.  In 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, tuition aid was distributed to parents 
according to financial aid need and directed in accordance with 
parental wishes of where parents choose to send their children. 
The vast majority of tuition aid nonetheless went to religious 
schools which provided education at a lower, affordable cost than 
other nonsectarian schools in the program. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court found that the Ohio Pilot Project did not amount 
to state endorsement of religion because the expenditure of aid 
reflected the private choices of students and parents.  Likewise, 
with race-based scholarships, I suggest that the mere 
administration of funds should not amount to university 
endorsement of racial discrimination simply because the race-
based preference of restricted grants reflects the private choices 
of donors, not universities. Further, the Supreme Court in Mitchell 
v. Helms 104 relied heavily on recent cases such as Agostini v. 
Felton105 to find that a program was neutral only if the government 
aid was directed as a result of genuinely independent and private 
choice of individuals.  
The Court in Zelman gave lip service to the other aspect 
of neutrality, namely that the Ohio Pilot Program does not 
somehow advance or differentiate between religions.  However, 
although no religion was differentiated, it could hardly be said the 
court honored this critical component of neutrality as a matter of 
intellectual honesty. Indeed, the court is able to set this neutrality 
concern aside and in so doing, it functionally, although not 
formally, overruled Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tip.106 
There it was said that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can 
be levied to support religious activities or institutions, whatever 
they may be called, or whatever form they mad adopt to teach or 
104 530 U.S. 793 (2000).  In Mitchell, the Court endorsed and defined the 
new Agostini test.  It proceeded to consider government school aid under the 
first two prongs of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403U.S. 602 (1971).  However, when 
reaching the second element as whether government aid neither advance or 
prohibit religion, the court employed the revised Agostini test to determine if 
the primary effect of the program advanced religion.  
105 521 U.S. 203 (1997).  The Agostini test is a revised version of the 
Lemon test to address the question of state aid. Justice O’Connor set forth 
three new requirements. First, aid cannot result in the governmental 
indoctrination of a religion. Second, there can be no discrimination among 
different religions.  Third, there can be no excessive entanglement with 
religion.  The Zelman never addressed the question of excessive entanglement.  
As in Mitchell, the Zelman court examined the first two prongs of the Lemon 
test.  
106 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  
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practice religion.107 As Justice Souter ask: “How can a court 
consistently leave Everson on the books and approve the Ohio 
vouchers?  The answer is that it cannot.”108 The analogy may also 
help to explain why scholarships that are open to all races might 
be disproportionately awarded to Native Americans because as is 
Zelman, where grants did not discriminate between religious and 
nonreligious schools, it did not matter that funds 
disproportionately ended up in the coffers of 96.6% of religious 
schools.109 Moreover, the Zelman analogy is also useful in 
showing that the use of public state revenue for race-based 
scholarship may not necessarily negate neutrality since private 
individual choice takes on new significance in the analogy to 
Zelman.
However, because Zelman tuition aid did not 
discriminate between religious and nonreligious schools, the same 
cannot be said for pure race-based (as opposed to race-conscious) 
scholarships which do make a clear distinction in eligibility 
criteria.  The analogy, however, is not intended to replicate the 
identical structure as the Ohio Pilot Project, but merely to 
illustrate that a scholarship that is payable to the parents or the 
student entitled to the scholarship is directed in accordance 
wherever the parent and student wish, and not the university. 
Thus, there is a multi-layered analysis of private choice.  The 
private choice of donors to restrict aid on the basis of race and 
the private choice of scholarship recipients to direct the aid to 
whatever institution would be acceptable.  This accounts for why 
a Gates Millennium scholarship or United Negro College fund 
might withstand strict scrutiny for each involves private donors 
and private recipients without any university intervention.   
As in Mitchell, the Zelman court examined the first two 
prongs of the Lemon test.  Accordingly, the Court never addressed 
the question of excessive entanglement of religion separately, 
which after Agostini has become more prevalently conflated into 
the “effect” inquiry.110 It is nonetheless helpful, however, to 
briefly revisit what the Agostini court believed constituted 
excessive entanglement because OCR’s prohibition on 
institutions that “administer” race based financial aid suggest 
colleges and universities become unduly or excessively entangled 
with the impermissible use of race.  Left unclarified, 
107 Id at 16. 
108 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 688.  
109 Id. at 703.  
110 As the court in Agostini v. Felton notes:  
…to assess whether an entanglement is “excessive” are 
similar to the factors we use to examine “effect.”…Thus 
it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant 
and treat it-as we did in Walz—as an aspect of the inquiry 
onto a stature’s effect.” 
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“administering” race-based scholarship funds can  mean just 
about anything and may be overly-inclusive. In theoretically 
following the Establishment Clause analogy to its logical 
endpoint, it would be reasonable to assume that a university 
violates the law by administering race-exclusive funds, unless the 
administration of those race-exclusive scholarships were 
somehow deemed an “excessive” entanglement.  In looking to 
the factors in Agostini as to what comprises excessive 
entanglement, we learn that: (1) pervasive monitoring; (2) 
administrative cooperation and (3) the increased dangers of 
political divisiveness are relevant factors to consider.111 
To be sure, in a private, race-based restricted 
scholarship where a college selects candidates, there is bound to 
be some administrative cooperation.  Likewise, in an institution 
where minority race-based scholarships come under the public 
scrutiny of a predominantly white student body, the very 
distribution and restricted eligibility criteria of these minority 
race-exclusive scholarships are sure to enhance the dangers of 
political divisiveness on these campuses.  But query whether 
these two factors combined render a race-based scholarship 
excessively administered?  The Agostini court writes:  Under our 
current understanding of the Establishment Clause, the last two 
considerations are insufficient by themselves to create an 
“excessive entanglement.”112 
Burdensome, pervasive monitoring might very well 
suffice to strike down a university administered race based 
scholarship under this analogy.  Cases where such a concern arise 
may occur where restricted scholarships require universities to 
interview, select and monitor minority scholarship finalists, or to 
monitor and report their grade point averages from semester to 
semester to donor recipients as potentially stipulated in the 
scholarship grant.  Pervasive monitoring may also require 
periodic reviews to ensure continued eligibility if the scholarship 
calls for regular assessments.   Likewise, any combination of the 
above monitoring requirements or the combination of 
monitoring requirements in conjunction with close administrative 
cooperation that may increase political divisiveness will surely fail 
as an excessively university-administered race-based scholarship. 
However, it is clear that by mitigating monitoring, 
interviewing and reporting requirements, donors can theoretically 
preserve the donative intent of scholarship grants that so happen 
to be university monitored. For instance, donors can limit some 
of the reporting requirements by a university and shift that 
responsibility instead to the scholarship recipient directly who can 
111 473 U.S. at 413-414. 
112 Id.
2004]  Towards An Establishment Clause Theory  
 
40
collect and share transcripts, update reports their academic 
progress and certify its continued eligibility.  Likewise, donors can 
follow up with candidates that are initially identified by the 
college or university.  
The novel application of the Establishment Clause 
analogy, while not identical, speaks to real issue of neutrality that 
is implicit in the debate of administering race-based scholarships 
that should be truthfully acknowledged.  There is no concern 
about improper university indoctrination of race as the Grutter 
court has already established race-based diversity as worthy of a 
compelling state interest. Moreover, there is no concern that a 
college or university would establish an imprimatur on race-based 
scholarships merely or solely because it identifies potential 
candidates meeting specified eligibility criteria which have been 
established not by the university, but by private donors.  
Although on its face such funds are not neutral to race in the 
same way funds were facially neutral to religion in Zelman, it is 
clear that the private choices of donors, like parents, provide a 
theoretical basis to “immunize” universities from liability.  In 
today’s day and age, it is exceedingly difficult to justify race-
based/race-exclusive scholarships, particularly in light of the 
Bollinger cases.  Conversely, race-based aid is the most effective 
means to achieve underrepresented racial diversity of Native 
Americans, native Blacks and non-white Latinos. These 
diametrically opposed and unyielding realities will mean that well 
intentioned universities will now have to code aid to correlate to 
racial characteristics such as sickle cell anemia in order to avoid 
frustrating its institutional mission-driven diversity they have 
come to value.  Race-based aid should be distinguished for a 
number of doctrinal and policy reasons from admissions.  If not, 
form will triumph over substance in the allocation of financial aid 
to racial minorities through disguised and contrived correlations 
that only reflect the enduring significance of race.  
 
*** 
